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NOTES
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS: WHEN DO THEY GIVE
RISE TO ENFORCEABLE LEGAL RIGHTS? THE UNITED
NATIONS CHARTER, THE BYRD AMENDMENT AND A SELF-
EXECUTING TREATY ANALYSIS*
As the United Nations enters its fourth decade, it is significant to note
the absence of attempts to relate Security Council resolutions to rights
enforceable in United States Courts.' The only case to date which has
raised the issue of domestic rights created by Security Council resolu-
tions is the 1972 case of Diggs v. Shultz,2 which was brought to compel
the Secretary of the Treasury to comply with an embargo on the impor-
tation of chrome products from Southern Rhodesia which was imposed
by Security Council resolutions3 supported by executive orders.' The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals accepted the premise that en-
forceable legal rights had been created5 but then held that the subse-
quent enactment by Congress of the Byrd Amendment' had, by the
later-in-time rule,7 abrogated any obligations and rights created by the
* This Note was selected by the Cornell Law School faculty International Legal Studies
Committee as a co-recipient of the 1976 Henry White Edgerton Prize in international law.
1. It is widely agreed that, unlike the General Assembly, the Security Council has the
power to create obligations binding upon member states of the United Nations. See, e.g.,
Higgins, The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which U.N. Resolutions are Binding Under
Article 25 of the Charter?, 21 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 270, 275 (1972). This interpretation was
underscored most recently by the former chief United States delegate to the United
Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, when he referred to the anti-Zionism resolution passed by
the General Assembly on November 10, 1975: "Everything the General Assembly does is
hortatory, recommendatory, and doesn't have the force of law, unlike the Security Council
which has the right to issue a legally binding action order." N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1975,
at 17, col. 4.
2. 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973).
3. S.C. Res. 232, U.N. Doc. S/INF/21/Rev. 1 (1966); S.C. Res. 253, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/23fRev. 1 (1968).
4. Exec. Order No. 11,419, 3 C.F.R. § 196 (1974), 22 U.S.C. § 287c n. (1970); Exec. Order
No. 11,322, 3 C.F.R. § 184 n. (1974), 22 U.S.C. § 287c n. (1970).
5. The Diggs opinion does not make clear whether the court considered these rights to
exist before, or only after, the Executive Orders were issued. In introducing the issue,
however, it speaks of the Executive Orders as "establishing criminal sanctions for viola-
tions of the embargo," thereby implying that all other implications of the embargo existed
before the executive orders were issued. 470 F.2d at 463.
6. Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act, 50 U.S.C. § 98(h) (1971). See note
85 infra and accompanying text.
7. By the rule lex posterior derogat priori, it is recognized that if a treaty and a federal
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resolutions and executive orders involved. Since that time, United Na-
tions concern with the Rhodesian situation has persisted, resulting in six
resolutions reaffirming the sanctions created by the resolutions consid-
ered in Diggs.' Most significantly, four of these resolutions have been
enacted subsequent to the Byrd Amendment? The question has arisen,
therefore, of the effect of these resolutions in United States Courts in
light of the continued existence of the Byrd Amendment. If these or
other United Nations Security Council resolutions can create rights and
obligations enforceable in domestic courts the result would have impor-
tant significance for domestic litigants.
After a brief discussion of the doctrine of self-execution and the judi-
cial application of its principles to the United Nations Charter, this
Note will examine the current legal status of the Byrd Amendment in
light of subsequent United Nations Security Council resolutions.
I
BACKGROUND OF THE SELF-EXECUTION DOCTRINE
Article VI, clause 2 of the United States Constitution declares that
"all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land." Chief Justice
Marshall rendered the initial interpretation of this clause early in our
history when he stated that while most nations require sovereign imple-
mentation to give an international agreement intraterritorial effect,
[i]n the United States a different principle is established. Our Constitu-
tion declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be
regarded in Courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature,
whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision.
But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of
the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself
to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must
execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court."
statute are in direct contradiction, the more recent supersedes the earlier of the two, since
both are the law of the land. See Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 45 (1951); Clark v.
Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 508-509 (1947). The appellants in Diggs argued that this rule need
not be applied, citing the canon of construction that a statute and treaty, if possible,
should be construed as being consistent. The court rejected this argument in finding that
the Byrd Amendment's major purpose was to abrogate obligations created by the Rhode-
sian embargo. 470 F.2d at 466.
8. S.C. Res. 333, U.N. Doc. S/INF/29 (1973); S.C. Res. 320, U.N. Doc. S/INF/28 (1972);
S.C. Res. 318, U.N. Doc. S/INF/28 (1972); S.C. Res. 314, U.N. Doc. S/INF/28 (1972); S.C.
Res. 288, U.N. Doc. S/INF/25 (1970); S.C. Res. 277, U.N. Doc. S/INF/25 (1970).
9. These are resolutions 314, 318, 320 and 333, supra note 8.
10. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
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In 1884, in the Head Money Cases," the Supreme Court applied the self-
execution doctrine and found that individuals, and not just nations,
could derive rights from treaties: "[A] treaty . . . is a law of the land
as an act of Congress is, whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by
which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined. '"'
A court is required to resort to a treaty just as it would resort to a statute
for a rule of decision in the case before it.' 3
Even though a treaty may provide a rule by which rights may be
determined and at the same time contain no executory language, there
are further doctrines which may prevent it from having self-executing
status. Treaties calling for the expenditure of funds, inasmuch as they
are ineffective without an accompanying appropriation, are uniformly
considered to be non-self-executing. 4 Similarly, a self-executing treaty
cannot deal with other matters which have been expressly and exclu-
sively delegated to Congress.' 5
The principles involved in determining self-execution are generally
stated in terms of restrictions on the areas with which the language of a
treaty may deal, but several considerations must be kept in mind in
order to prevent the doctrine from being carried so far as to virtually
negate the intent of the Article VI language making treaties the supreme
law of the land. Even though commerce is an element over which control
is expressly delegated to Congress, such control is not exclusive, and
treaties dealing with commerce have commonly been held self-
executing.'6 Arguments that other nations require implementing legisla-
tion to give effect to a certain treaty have not resulted in decisions that
11. 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
12. Id. at 598-99.
13. Id. See generally Evans, Self-Executing Treaties in the United States of America,
30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 178 (1953); Comment, Criteria for Self-Executing Treaties, 1968 U.
Ii.l.. L.F. 238. The Evans article also contains an analysis of similar practice in nine other
nations.
14. Turner v. American Baptist Missionary Union, 24 F. Cas. 344 (No. 14,251) (D.
Mich. 1852). A list of examples of such treaties may be found in The Over the Top, 5 F.2d
838, 845 (D. Conn. 1925).
15. Robertson v. General Electric Co., 32 F.2d 495, 500 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S.
571 (1929). The subject of this case was a treaty dealing with patents, over which Congress
has power. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 7. Although patent treaties, due to the detail required
in implementation, are usually drafted intending further legislation, more recent cases
have held some patent treaties to be self-executing. See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v.
T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956). There remains, however, a presumption against
self-execution in such areas. Comment, Criteria for Self-Executing Treaties, 1968 U. ILL.
L.F. 238, 242-43.
16. See Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943); Bacardi Corp. of America v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940);
Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
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the United States must follow suit." Neither has the fact that a treaty
contains language of limitation been enough, in itself, to result in the
treaty being held to be non-self-executing.'" The result of these consider-
ations is that the doctrine of self-execution, even though negatively
defined, makes treaties the law of the land without further congressional
implementation.
II
THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE DOCTRINE OF
SELF-EXECUTION IN UNITED STATES COURTS
A. CHARTER ARTICLES WHICH HAVE BEEN HELD TO BE NON-SELF-
EXECUTING
1. Articles 55 and 56
Ironically, the only time Supreme Court Justices have indicated self-
executing status for articles of the United Nations Charter, the result
was a concurrence by four Justices in a position which has subsequently
been rejected by every lower court which has considered the issue.'9 In
Oyama v. California,0 the Supreme Court declared the California alien
land law unconstitutional as a violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
17. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 417 (1886); Indemnity Ins. Co. of N.
America v. Pan American Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
18. See Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5 (1936); United States v. Rauscher, 119
U.S. 407 (1886). See also Annot., 4 A.L.R. 1387 (1919).
19. Judicial discussion of the United Nations Charter has been limited, for the most
part, to the lower courts. Only six Supreme Court opinions have even mentioned the
Charter or related matter. Even then, with the possible exception of Oyama v. California,
332 U.S. 633 (1968), see notes 20-22 infra and accompanying text, any reference to the
Charter has been insignificant. Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70,
71 (1955), only mentioned that the Supreme Court of Iowa "ruled that the provisions of
the United Nations Charter have no bearing on the case" before dismissing certiorari on
Fourteenth Amendment grounds; in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), the Court did not
deal with the appellant's contention that the denial by the Secretary of State of his
application for a visa to Cuba violated rights guaranteed to him by the United Nations
Declaration of Human Rights; in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646 n.5 (1966),
the court said in a footnote that contentions based on articles 55 and 56 of the Charter
need not be dealt with; in Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934, 938 (1967), Justice Douglas
dissented to a denial of certiorari, raising, inter alia, the question of whether article 39 of
the Charter would "embrace hostilities in Vietnam or give rights to individuals affected
to complain, or in other respects give rise to justiciable controversies;" and in Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 673 n.9 (1974), the court merely footnoted
the fact that the United States had ceased transmission of information concerning Puerto
Rico to the Secretary General of the United Nations under article 73(e) of the Charter.
20. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
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ment'.2 Concurring opinions maintained that the California law was in
conflict with the law of the land as established by articles 55 and 56 of
the United Nations Charter.22 Article 55 states that the United Nations
"shall promote" conditions such as "higher standards of living," "full
employment," "solutions of international economic, social, health, and
related problems," and "universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as
to race, sex, language, or religion." Article 56 further recognizes that
United Nations members "pledge" to take action "in co-operation with
the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article
55.',
The leading case declaring articles 55 and 56 to be non-self-executing
is the California case of Sei Fujii v. State.? An alien Japanese, ineligible
for citizenship, contested a lower court decision that land purchased by
him in 1948 had escheated to the state under the California alien land
law enacted subsequent to the Oyama decision. Although the California
court held the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, it did so
only after first considering the contention that the land law had been
invalidated and superseded by certain provisions of the United Nations
Charter. After declaring the preamble and article 1 to "state general
purposes and objectives" which "do not purport to impose legal obliga-
tions," the court addressed articles 55 and 56, stating:
Although the member nations have obligated themselves to cooperate
with the international organization in promoting respect for, and observ-
ance of, human rights, it is plain that it was contemplated that future
legislative action by the several nations would be required to accomplish
21. Id. at 647.
22. The language of these two opinions indicates an interpretation of the articles as self-
executing. For instance, Justice Black stated:
There are additional reasons now why that law stands as an obstacle to the free
accomplishment of our policy in the international field. One of these reasons is
that we have recently pledged ourselves to cooperate with the United Nations to
"promote ... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."
How can this nation be faithful to this international pledge if state laws which
bar land ownership and occupancy by aliens on account of race are permitted to
be enforced?
332 U.S. at 649-50 (footnote omitted). Black's opinion was followed by one in which
Justice Murphy wrote:
[The California law's] inconsistency with the Charter, which has been duly
ratified and adopted by the United States, is but one more reason why the statute
must be condemned.
332 U.S. at 673.
23. 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
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the declared objectives, and there is nothing to indicate that these provi-
sions were intended to become rules of law for the courts of this country
upon ratification of the charter.
24
Subsequent decisions have cited the Sei Fujii analysis in holding articles
55 and 56 to be non-self-executing, and therefore ineffective without
further legislation. These cases have involved attacks upon private con-
tract provisions,2 visa requirements 6 and quota systems 2 established
by the Immigration and Nationality Act, and a New York literacy test
used in determining eligibility to vote. None of these cases has given
the articles any effect against the challenged legislation.
2. Articles 73(a), 76, and 79; Non-Self-Governing and Trusteeship
Territories
In the 1974 case of United States v. Vargas29 a defendant claimed that
conscription of Puerto Ricans under the Selective Service Act violated
article 73(a) of the United Nations Charter, which provides that mem-
bers assuming the administration of non-self-governing territories are
"to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned,
their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their
just treatment, and their protection against abuses." The District Court
for Puerto Rico declared this article to be non-self-executing, since it
was "not a specific mandate, but rather a general standard or goal to
be followed." 30
Articles 76 and 79 deal with the establishment of trusteeship territo-
ries. Their language is to the effect that the terms of a trusteeship
agreement "shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned."'" In
Pauling v. McElroy,32 the District Court for the District of Columbia
stated that these provisions are non-self-executing and "do not vest any
of the plaintiffs with individual legal rights which they may assert in
this Court." Any claims under these articles were said to be assertable
"only by diplomatic negotiations between the sovereignties con-
cerned. '"
24. Id. at 722, 242 P.2d 617 at 621.
25. Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110 (1953),
aff'd per curiam, 348 U.S. 880 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
26. Hitai v. Immigration and Nationalization Service, 343 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1965).
27. Vlissidis v. Anadell, 262 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1959).
28. Camacho v. Rogers, 199 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
29. 370 F. Supp. 908 (D.P.R. 1974).
30. Id. at 915.
31. U.N. CHARTER art. 79. Article 76 sets out the "basic objectives" of the trusteeship
system.
32. 164 F. Supp. 390 (D.D.C. 1958).
33. Id. at 393.
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B. SELF-EXECUTING CHARTER ARTICLES
1. Articles 104 and 105
The California court in the Sei Fujii case, after declaring articles 55
and 56 to be non-self-executing, went on to admit that certain Charter
articles were indeed intended to be self-executing." More specifically,
reference was made to article 104, which gives the United Nations neces-
sary legal status within the territory of member nations, and article 105,
which grants certain "privileges and immunities" to the organization
within such territory. In support of the self-executing status given these
two articles, the Sei Fujii court referred to Curran v. City of New York,3"
a 1947 New York State case which involved an action to set aside grants
of land and easements made by the City of New York to the United
Nations for its headquarters site. In holding articles 104 and 105 to be
applicable and self-executing, the Curran court stated:
Even without further action by Congress or by the State, the effect of
Article 104 would be to give the United Nations the legal status and
capacity to own land in the United States. Also, that without further
action by Congress or the State, the immunities "necessary for the fulfill-
ment of its purposes," conferred upon the United Nations by Article 105,
includes [sic] immunity from taxation.38
Article 104 has also been found to give the United Nations the right to
bring damage actions in United States courts.37
2. Article 2 (4)
In the 1974 case of United States v. Toscanino, s the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals made it clear that a Charter article, without any other
legislation, may be self-executing, and thereby create enforceable legal
rights. 3 Article 2 (4) states that "all Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the terri-
34. The Sei Fujii court stated that "when the framers of the charter intended to make
certain provisions effective without the aid of implementing legislation they employed
language which is clear and definite and manifests that intention," citing articles 104 and
105 as examples. Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal.2d 718, 722, 242 P.2d 617, 621.
35. 191 Misc. 229, 77 N.Y.S.2d 206 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
36. Id. at 234, 77 N.Y.S.2d at 212.
37. International Refugee Organization v. Republic S.S. Corp., 189 F.2d 858 (4th Cir.
1951); Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1950).
38. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
39. Toscanino actually considered articles 104 and 105 along with the International
Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 288-288f (1970), but the presence of this Act
was not found necessary in order to give the articles domestic effect. See also quotation
accompanying note 36 supra.
[Vol. 9:298
Security Council Resolutions
torial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." The
Toscanino court ruled that the kidnapping of an individual in Uruguay,
in order to bring him back to the United States to face narcotics charges,
violated this provision.4" Since this article has received no implementing
legislation, such a finding is clear recognition of self-executing status.
C. SELF-EXECUTING AcTs TAKEN UNDER ARTICLES OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CHARTER
On at least two occasions, courts have interpreted acts in conjunction
with articles of the United Nations Charter. In Keeney v. United
States,4' the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed a conviction
for contempt of Congress in which a Senate subcommittee witness had
refused to disclose whether or not anyone in the State Department had
aided her in obtaining employment with the United Nations. The rever-
sal was based, in part, on a privilege created by the Staff Rules of the
United Nations in conjunction with articles 100 and 105.42 Staff Rule 7
includes a provision that staff members "shall not communicate to any
other person any unpublished information known to them by reason of
their official position." Explaining his opinion that this rule is supported
by articles 100 and 105, Judge Edgerton said:
Compulsory disclosure of the persons who influence appointments to the
staff of the United Nations would not be consistent with the independ-
ence of the Organization on "the exclusively international character of
the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff * * *." (Art.
100, Par. 2.) And the prospect of such disclosure might influence staff
members, in one degree or another, to regulate their official conduct with
a view to avoid embarrassment of sponsors. The privilege of nondisclo-
sure is, therefore, "necessary for the independent exercise of their func-
tions in connection with the Organization." (Art. 105, Par. 2.)3
40. 500 F.2d at 277. The Toscanino court went on to imply that the Security Council
resolution (U.N. Doc. 112 (1960)), passed in response to the kidnapping in 1960 of Adolf
Eichmann from Argentina by Israel, had force as a statement of law in regard to such an
international kidnapping. This implication was weakened by a subsequent statement by
the court that "the resolution merely recognized a long-standing principle of international
law." Id. at 278.
41. 218 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
42. Although the Keeney court reversed "because of errors in the admission of evi-
dence," Judge Edgerton's opinion was careful to state, in reference to the lower court's
admission of evidence, that "[in so far as the answer depends upon data in the files of
the United Nations or upon information derived from those files, it was privileged by the
Charter and the Staff Rules and could not legally be revealed." 218 F.2d at 845.
43. Id.
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The Keeney court, therefore, recognized the binding force of the law
created by the Staff Rules in conjunction with Charter articles 100 and
105.
In Saipan v. United States Department of the Interior," citizens of the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands challenged the execution by the
High Commissioner of a lease permitting construction and operation of
a hotel on public land. After the court had "assume[d] without decid-
ing" that certain other articles of the Charter were not self-executing,
it entered into a discussion of the Trusteeship Agreement which had
been created pursuant to the authority granted for such purposes by
article 79.*1 Referring specifically to the language of article 6 of the
Trusteeship Agreement requiring the United States to "protect the in-
habitants against the loss of their lands and resources," the court con-
cluded that "the Trusteeship Agreement can be a source of rights en-
forceable by an individual litigant in a domestic court of law."46 The
source of such rights was not the Charter article itself, but rather the
agreement concluded under the authority of the article.
III
APPLICATION OF THE SELF-EXECUTION DOCTRINE TO
ARTICLE 25 AND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
A. ANALOGIES AND DISTINCTIONS: PUTTING THE CASE LAW IN PERSPECTIVE
There are several comparisons which can be drawn between Security
Council resolutions and the acts found to be self-executing in the
Keeney and Saipan cases. As with the Staff Rules in Keeney, a Security
Council resolution is promulgated, not by all parties to the Charter, but
rather by an organ established by the Charter. Like the Trusteeship
Agreement in Saipan, a Security Council resolution supported by the
United States is a written document to which the United States has
specifically agreed. Just as the Staff Rules were considered in conjunc-
44. 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974).
45. Article 79 provides that the terms of trusteeship for territories in the trusteeship
system "shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned . U.N. CHARTER art.
79.
46. 502 F.2d at 97. The Saipan court went on to run the Trusteeship Agreement through
the self-execution wringer and found it to come out intact. The agreement's concern with
the local economy and environment was "explicit," the enforcement of its terms required
"little legal or administrative innovation in the domestic fora," and to send the plaintiffs
to the alternative forum-the Security Council-would have "present[ed] to the plain-
tiffs obstacles so great as to make their rights virtually unenforceable." Accordingly, the
court concluded, the features of the Agreement suggested "the intention to establish
direct, affirmative, and judicially enforceable rights." 502 F.2d at 97-98.
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tion with articles 100 and 105, and the Trusteeship Agreement was
considered under the authority of article 79, Security Council resolu-
tions must be considered alongside article 25, which states: "The Mem-
bers of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions
of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."
As is the case in any comparison of new issues with decided opinion,
while there are analogies there are also distinctions which must be
drawn. In Keeney, at least one of the articles considered in conjunction
with the Staff Rules had been held to be self-executing in its own right
and could quite possibly have been interpreted as creating the privilege
even without Staff Rule 7.47 Article 25 has not been held to be self-
executing and, without being considered in conjunction with a Security
Council resolution, it clearly could not create enforceable rights and
obligations. " This distinction, however, leads to an analogy with article
79, considered in Saipan, which was held non-self-executing." That did
not prevent the Ninth Circuit from giving full effect to the agreement
entered into under that article.
B. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AS "TREATY OBLIGATIONS"
In Diggs v. Shultz, 5 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals viewed
the Security Council resolutions involved as creating treaty obliga-
tions,' and accordingly, the Byrd Amendment 2 was considered by that
court to have the clear purpose "to detach this country from the U.N.
47. Article 105, mentioned in Keeney, was held self-executing in Curran v. City of New
York, 191 Misc. 229, 77 N.Y.S.2d 206 (Sup. Ct. 1947). See notes 35-36 supra and accompa-
nying text.
48. Unitl a resolution is passed by the Security Council there is no "decision" to "agree
to accept to carry out." U.N. CHARTER art. 25. One interpretation would find that Chapter
VII of the Charter (Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace,
and Acts of Aggression) was implemented by Congress through the United Nations Partic-
ipation Act of 1945, 22 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1970). Note, Security Council Resolutions in
United States Courts, 50 IND. L.J. 83, 104 (1974). This interpretation implies that Con-
gress viewed the entire Charter as non-self-executing but then voted to delegate legislative
powers to the Security Council in instances of mandatory article 25 resolutions. The
reluctance of Congress to delegate any degree of sovereign power to an international
organization, however, clearly indicates that the United Nations Participation Act was not
meant as an implementation of portions of the Charter or even as a determination of the
self-executing status of the Charter, but rather as a delegation of powers and responsibili-
ties to the President in his response to actions proposed by the United Nations under its
Charter.
49. In Saipan it was the Trusteeship Agreement, not article 79, that was held to be self-
executing. Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 97-98 (9th Cir. 1974).
50. 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
51. Id. at 466.
52. 50 U.S.C. § 98(h) (1970).
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Boycott of Southern Rhodesia in blatant disregard of our treaty under-
takings.""3 Although the court recognized that treaty obligations ex-
isted, the fact that the President had implemented the resolutions
through executive orders 4 relieved it from considering whether such
resolutions would have constituted binding obligations without the ex-
ecutive orders. If a Security Council resolution is framed in the language
of self-execution, Diggs raises the next question of when such a resolu-
tion itself actually becomes a binding "treaty obligation.
15
Here, two basic requirements originating at the international level
come into play: first, whether the Security Council has made a "deci-
sion," and second, whether the action has been taken "in accordance
with the present Charter." 56 Dispute has arisen over what constitutes a
"decision" of the Security Council. 7 The pre-Byrd Amendment resolu-
tions concerning Rhodesia 8 are the only "breach of peace" resolutions59
to date to include the verb "to decide," so they are as yet the only
resolutions to meet the most narrow and literal reading of article 25. The
53. 470 F.2d at 466.
54. Exec. Order No. 11,419, 3 C.F.R. § 196 n. (1974), 22 U.S.C. § 287c n. (1970); Exec.
Order No. 11,322, 3 C.F.R. § 184 n. (1974), 22 U.S.C. § 287c n. (1970).
55. It is important to note at this point that treaty obligations can be incurred not only
through negotiation by the President and ratification by the Senate, the usual procedure,
but also through the President's use of Executive Agreements. United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE CoNswrrrUrloN 177-87 (1972); Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the
President to Conclude International Agreements, 64 YALE L.J. 345 (1955). These can be
concluded not only where Congress has sanctioned Presidential action, but are available,
according to some authorities, even where Presidential action has no congressional sanc-
tion. HENKIN, supra at 432 n. 40; Comment, Self-Executing Executive Agreements: A
Separation of Powers Problem, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 137 (1974). Contra, United States v.
Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953). The major limitations on executive
agreements have been a prohibition against dealing unilaterally with the enumerated
powers of Congress, and an expressed doubt that an agreement could supersede a prior
inconsistent federal statute. When the agreement is entered into with prior congressional
approval, however, the former limitation falls by definition and the latter is reduced to a
de minimus effect. Mathews, supra, at 381.
56. These requirements are imposed by U.N. CHARTER art. 25. The International Court
of Justice has concluded that a broad range of Security Council resolutions, including
those pursuant to articles 24 and 25, can be binding upon U.N. member states. Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwith-
standing Security Council resolution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. 16. This position is far from
receiving unanimous approval from U.N. members. See Higgins, The Advisory Opinion
on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions are Binding UnderArticle 25 of the Charter?, 21 INT'L
& CoMP. L.Q. 270 (1972).
57. Higgins, supra note 56, at 275.
58. S.C. Res. 253, U.N. Doc. S/INF/23/Rev. 1 (1968); S.C. Res. 232, U.N. Doc.
SIINF/21/Rev. 1 (1966).
59. See note 62 infra and accompanying text.
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best rule, however, seems to be that an indication of decisive intent need
not necessarily carry the verb "to decide" in order that it fit within
article 25. Therefore, other resolutions may create binding obligations
through the use of comparable language. 0
The bulk of debate in the international arena has centered on what
decisions of the Security Council are "in accordance with the present
Charter."'" The most restrictive view, which has generally been the one
followed by the United States, is that a decision under article 25 is
binding only if made following a determination of the existence of a
breach of the peace under article 39.62 Under this view, such a determi-
nation must have been made in either the instant resolution or in a prior
one before the resolution can create a binding international obligation
on the United States as a nation. 3
60. See generally Higgins, supra note 56.
61. Id. at 275-86.
62. Article 39 requires the Security Council to "determine the existence of any threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and to make recommendations or
take other action to "restore international peace and security." The restrictive position
was the one taken by the United States before the I.C.J. in the advisory opinion on
Namibia. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. 16, 227-
98 (dissenting opinion). This view is also reflected in the report of Secretary of State
Stettinius after the San Francisco Conference which adopted the Charter. Stated the
report:
Decisions of the Security Council take on a binding quality only as they relate to
the prevention or suppression of breaches of the peace. With respect to the pacific
settlement of disputes, the Council has only the power of recommendation ....
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE RESULTS OF THE SAN
FRANCISCO CONFERENCE, PUB. No. 2349, CONF. SERIES 71, at 78 (1945).
63. At least one authority interprets the International Court ruling in the Namibia case,
supra notes 56 & 62, as holding that Security Council resolutions may be made binding
under either article 24 or article 25 and pursuant to the specific powers of Chapters VI
(Pacific Settlement of Disputes), VII (Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace,
Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression), VIII (Regional Arrangements), and XII
(International Trusteeship System). Higgins, supra note 56 at 286. This view is based on
the language of article 24 of the Charter, which places upon the Security Council the
"primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" and lists
the four Chapters above as outlining the "specific powers granted to the Security Council
.."A recent commentator has extended Higgins' article 24 analysis and has con-
tended that individual legal rights enforceable in United States courts may arise pursuant
to article 24 as well as article 25. Note, Security Council Resolutions in United States
Courts, 50 IND. L.J. 83, 89-91 (1974). Although the Higgins analysis is probably correct in
ascertaining the existence of obligations binding upon United Nations members in their
exercise of international relations, authority for extending the analysis to individual rights
is at best tenuous if one analyzes the domestic history of Charter interpretation. See, e.g.,
note 56, supra and The United Nations Participation Act of 1945, 22 U.S.C. § 287(c)
(1970).
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This does not, however, determine when such an international obliga-
tion might create rights enforceable by individuals in United States
courts. To answer this question, it is necessary to look to the actions of
the executive and legislative branches relating to a resolution passed by
the Security Council. There are five possible procedural stages at which
arguments can be made that enforceable rights and obligations arise.
These stages are: (1) upon passage of the resolution by the Security
Council, (2) upon passage of the resolution by the Security Council only
if the United States casts an affirmative vote, (3) upon passage of the
resolution by the Security Council plus confirmation of its provisions
through a presidential order as provided for in the United Nations Par-
ticipation Act,"' (4) upon passage of the resolution by the Security Coun-
cil plus its formal ratification as a treaty by the President upon the
advice and consent of the Senate,'5 (5) upon passage of the resolution
by the Security Council plus some type of legislative implementation by
Congress.
At the fifth stage, there is no question that enforceable rights and
obligations exist. The legislative act in itself creates enforceable law
which does not depend for its validity upon whether the Security Coun-
cil resolution it follows was binding or non-binding, self-executing or
non-self-executing.
Stage four is perhaps no more than an alternative to stage five, involv-
ing relatively the same participants as did the latter stage. The differ-
ence here would be that the President would act first in submitting the
resolution to the Senate as a treaty to be consented to by two-thirds of
that body. Unlike stage five, this process would bypass the House of
Representatives. Under Article VI of the United States Constitution, if
the resolution were framed in language of self-execution, this process
would nonetheless result in enforceable domestic law."6
As evidenced by Diggs v. Shultz,"7 any submission of a resolution to
Congress is unnecessary when the President, such as in stage three, has
pursued the directives of the resolution through an executive order giv-
ing definite and binding force to the resolution. In order to provide
guidelines for United States representation and participation in the
United Nations following our ratification of the U.N. Charter, Congress
passed the United Nations Participation Act 8 which gave the President
the power, "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of any other law," to give
64. 22 U.S.C. § 287c(a) (1970). See also notes 68-69 infra and accompanying text.
65. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
66. See notes 9-17 supra and accompanying text.
67. 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
68. 22 U.S.C. § 287c(a) (1970).
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effect to decisions of the Security Council made pursuant to Article 41
of the Charter by applying the measures called for in the resolution. As
a result, the President has the authority to create binding rights and
obligations at stage three of the above procedural outline, stemming
from the Participation Act's sanction of such an executive order.
Whether enforceable rights exist at stage two is a more difficult ques-
tion. The United Nations Participation Act gives the President the au-
thority "to give effect to decisions under the Charter . . through any
agency which he may designate," 9 and the United States representative
in the Security Council is an agent of the Executive who has not only
been designated by the President but has taken office with the consent
of the Senate 0 Furthermore, the representative must, "at all times, act
in accordance with the instructions of the President transmitted by the
Secretary of State;"' thus, the President also has the power to deter-
mine just how the representative will vote on any resolution before the
Security Council." The President thereby has as much control over the
United State's vote in the Security Council as he has over regulations
promulgated through executive orders made pursuant to congressional
sanction. It would be entirely reasonable, therefore, for a Security Coun-
cil resolution to create enforceable rights and obligations upon passage
with the United States' representative casting an affirmative vote.1
3
This proposition is also supported by a further argument, applying the
rule which recognizes that a self-executing executive agreement made
pursuant to a treaty can have the full effect of the self-executing treaty.
By directing his representative to vote for a given resolution, the Presi-
69. Id.
70. 22 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1970).
71. 22 U.S.C. § 287a (1970).
72. This analysis is parallel to Professor Henkin's treatment of "Sole Executive Agree-
ments" made pursuant to article 5 and 11 of the North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949, 63
Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. No. 1964 (effective Aug. 24, 1949). HENKIN, supra note 55, at 176, n.14.
For a discussion of the President's power to conclude such agreements despite curtailment
attempts such as the Bricker Amendment, see id. at 176-87.
73. One author has suggested that in such a case the political question doctrine would
be an "obstacle to domestic invocation of United Nations mandatory resolutions." Note,
Security Council Resolutions in United States Courts, 50 IND. L.J. 83, 107-112 (1974). This
opinion seems to stem from the statement in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) that
"[plrominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department . . . ." Such an interpretation ignores the fact that the Supreme Court has
not hesitated to adjudicate issues of whether the executive or the legislature has the power
to take certain actions. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); HENKIN, supra note 55, at 97-99.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 142
(1965).
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dent enters into an agreement made pursuant to article 25 of the United
Nations Charter. In doing so the President does not skirt congressional
authority since his action is taken pursuant to the authority granted him
by Congress through both the United Nations Participation Act and the
ratification of the United Nations Charter.
To summarize, at this point there are at least four procedures by
which a Security Council resolution may become the law of the land.
Congress may implement a resolution by separate legislation, the Presi-
dent may ratify the resolution as a full treaty upon the advice and
consent of two-thirds of the Senate, the President may give effect to a
resolution through executive order, or the President may give effect to
a resolution by instructing the United States representative to vote for
its passage in the Security Council. As seen above, this last method
must involve a resolution pursuant to articles 39 and 41 of the United
Nations Charter,76 and its language must be couched in terms which are
self-executing. Although scholars of international law would find bind-
ing obligations to arise from a Security Council resolution whether or
not the United States had voted for its passage," such as in the first
stage of Security Council resolution procedure, there is little authority
extending these obligations to individuals on the domestic level without
the acquiescence of some branch of the United States government.
IV
APPLYING THE ANALYSIS TO THE RHODESIAN
RESOLUTIONS AND DETERMINING THEIR EFFECT UPON THE
BYRD AMENDMENT
A. THE PRE-BYRD RESOLUTIONS
The two important pre-Byrd resolutions are resolutions 232 and 253,8
which were considered in Diggs v. Shultz.7" Each of these resolutions
makes direct reference to a determination of a breach of the peace in
Southern Rhodesia under Articles 39 and 41, and is, therefore, "in ac-
cordance with the present Charter."80 Each of the resolutions also con-
tains the word "decides" as its activating verb, thereby leaving no doubt
75. HENKIN, supra note 55, at 194.
76. See notes 61-66 supra and accompanying text.
77. See generally Higgins, supra note 56.
78. These two resolutions were both directed against Southern Rhodesia and directed
that members prevent the importation into their territories of commodities and products
originating from that country. S.C. Res. 232, U.N. Doc. S/INF/21 (1966); S.C. Res, 253,
U.N. Doc. S/INF/23 (1968).
79. 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973).
80. U.N. CHARTER art. 25. See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
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as to whether a "decision" of the Security Council is involved.8 ' The
language of these resolutions also demonstrates a clear intent that they
be self-executing;" nothing about them is executory in nature and would
require further implementation, 3 nor do they touch upon an* area re-
stricted by either constitutional limitations or delegations of power.8 '
Since both of the resolutions were passed with an affirmative vote by
the United States representative, the Diggs court had solid ground to
find that a binding treaty obligation existed even without the executive
orders which followed the resolutions.
B. THE BYRD AMENDMENT AND THE POST-BYRD RESOLUTIONS
On November 17, 1971, the President signed into law the Military
Procurement Act of 1971, section 503 of which constituted the Byrd
Amendment to the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act.
This amendment barred the President from prohibiting or regulating
the importation of "any material determined to be strategic and critical
pursuant to the provisions of this Act" so long as the material did not
come from a country listed as Communist-dominated under the Tariff
Schedules of the United States. 5 In January of 1972, the Office of For-
eign Assets Control, pursuant to the Byrd Amendment, issued a general
license authorizing the importation of a number of materials from Rho-
desia.86 This action led to the litigation involved in Diggs and the finding
that treaty obligations originating in the pre-Byrd resolutions had been
abrogated to the extent that the Byrd Amendment applied.,
81. U.N. CHARTER art. 25. See text accompanying notes 57-60 supra.
82. See, e.g., the following excerpt from Resolution 253:
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its determination that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia
constitutes a threat to international peace and security,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
3. Decides that, in furtherance of the objective of ending the rebellion, all
States Members of the United Nations shall prevent:
(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originat-
ing in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution
S.C. Res. 253, U.N. Doc. S/INF/23 (1968).
83. See quotation accompanying note 10 supra.
84. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
85. 50 U.S.C. § 98(h) (1970). The Tariff Schedules referred to in the section are con-
tained in 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1970).
86. 37 Fed. Reg. 1108 (1972).
87. 470 F.2d 461, 465-66 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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The adoption of the Byrd Amendment also aroused response from the
United Nations, including four Security Council resolutions reaffirming
the embargo created by resolutions 232 and 253.u Through incorporation
by reference to earlier resolutions, these resolutions have reaffirmed the
fact that they are pursuant to a finding of a breach of peace, and it is
arguable that they are "decisions" of the Security Council."0 They have
failed, however, to meet two requirements that would have enabled
them to create enforceable domestic rights and obligations. Each of the
four resolutions contains executory language that invalidates any claim
that they were intended to be self-executing." Moreover, the United
States has abstained from voting in the passage of each of these resolu-
tions, thus withholding the authority which would have made them law
by analysis either as an executive order under the United Nations Par-
ticipation Act or as an Executive Agreement under the authority of this
country's ratification of the United Nations Charter.'
C. A PROPOSAL FOR PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVE
The United Nations response to the Byrd Amendment has been
echoed in the halls of Congress, but with little substantive result. In
88. S.C. Res. 333, U.N. Doc. S/INF/29 (1973); S.C. Res. 320, U.N. Doc. S/INF/28
(1972); S.C. Res. 318, U.N. Doc. SINF/28 (1972); S.C. Res. 314, U.N. Doc. S/INF/28
(1972).
89. The new resolutions "recalled" the previous resolutions, which contained breach of
peace determinations. Once the Security Council has determined that a breach of peace
exists it does not seem necessary that such fact need be restated in every subsequent
resolution dealing with the same issue.
90. Executory language in these resolutions includes:
Resolution 314:
Urges all States to implement fully all Security Council resolutions establishing
sanctions against Southern Rhodesia ....
Resolution 318:
Demands that all Member States should scrupulously carry out their obligations
to implement fully Security Council resolutions 253 (1968), 277 (1970) and 314
(1972).
urges them to review the adequacy of the legislation and the practices fol-
lowed so far ...
Resolution 320:
Calls upon all States to implement fully all Security Council resolutions estab-
lishing sanctions against Southern Rhodesia . . ..
Resolution 333:
Requests States with legislation permitting importation of minerals and other
products from Southern Rhodesia to repeal it immediately . . ..
91. The use of executive orders to implement Security Council resolutions is discussed




December 1973, the Senate passed a bill92 introduced by Senator Hum-
phrey which would have restored the United States to full compliance
with the sanctions against Rhodesia imposed by Security Council reso-
lutions 232 and 253. This Senate action was reinforced by the ahinounce-
ment that the Ford Administration favored repeal of the Byrd Amend-
ment when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told a congressional com-
mittee that the amendment was not essential to our national security,
brought no real economic advantage, and was detrimental to the con-
duct of foreign relations.13 In the House of Representatives the State
Department again expressed its support of the repeal movement." The
House, however, postponed indefinitely a vote on its bill 5 in December
1974. When an identical bill was again introduced in the House, it
reached a final vote and was defeated on September 25, 1975.11
Despite the fact that Congress has been unwilling to change the law
established by the Byrd Amendment, the door to such legal transfigura-
tion is not closed to the Executive branch. A properly worded United
Nations Security Council resolution passed with an affirmative vote by
the United States would supersede the Byrd Amendment by the same
later-in-time rule97 which caused the amendment to prevail over the
earlier resolutions. If President Ford truly desires to see the Byrd
Amendment repealed, there can be little doubt that other members of
the United Nations would welcome United States initiative in enacting
an effective post-Byrd Security Council resolution. Although such a
method of abrogative legislation may be without precedent, the result
would bring domestic law in line with national obligation and put the
United States no longer "in blatant disregard of our treaty undertak-
ings.""9
CONCLUSION
Certain acts taken pursuant to articles of the United Nations Charter
can possess the status of a treaty creating binding rights and obligations
in United States courts. A Security Council resolution should be ac-
corded this status in the United States when it is binding by interna-
92. S. 1868, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See generally Note, The Price of United States
Noncompliance with United Nations Rhodesian Sanctions, 5 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 558
(1975).
93. N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1974, at 8, col. 3.
94. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1974, at 2, col. 1.
95. H.R. 8005, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
96. H.R. 1287, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), 121 Cong. Rec. H9155 (daily ed. Sep. 25,
1975). The vote was 187-209.
97. See note 7 supra.
98. Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973).
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tional standards, self-executing by domestic standards, and supported
by an affirmative vote of the United States in its passage. Although
post-Byrd Amendment resolutions have not met all of these require-
ments, the possibility of introducing such a resolution affords the execu-
tive branch a method of bringing domestic law into compliance with
international obligation without the necessity of submission to the cum-
bersome congressional process.
Ronald A. Brand
